Who would think that 850 white beads and 85 red
beads could actually transport an auditorium full of managers
back to B-school? But that is exactly what George P Koshy,
regional director-Asia, Omnex Inc.--down from Ann Arbour,
Michigan--did. Of course, with a little help from Dr Deming's
Red Bead Experiment, designed specifically to jog managers out
of their complacency and to remind them of their role and
responsibility towards ensuring quality in the finished
product.
THE GAME: Koshy reserves for himself the star role:
The Maverick Management (think Dilbert's boss with satanic
hair). He then asks for volunteers who don't mind being
laughed at--it's surprising just how many managers spring up
with alacrity--and who are then cast into supporting roles:
five operators on a shopfloor; two quality inspectors,
positioned at different corners of the stage; a chief quality
inspector, who supervises the two inspectors; and finally, a
defects record-keeper.
The five ``workers'' are then trained in their job: they
have before them a plastic bowl consisting of 850 small white
beads and 85 red beads. Each worker is given a paddle which
has 50 holes perforated in it. For ``production'' each
operator has to run the paddle through the beads and scoop up
50 beads. White beads represent a product that can be
sold--all red beads are a defect. Even though zero-defect is
the goal, the management generously specifies that the maximum
number of defects--or red beads--allowed per worker is one.
Each worker must now scoop the paddle through the balls,
and then carry the paddle to Inspector A and B, to record the
defects. Both inspectors note down the defects independently
and silently. The supervisor then checks if both have written
down the same number of defects, and announces the defects per
worker aloud. Each time a worker's productivity is announced,
management has something threatening or cajoling to say. The
game records this process over five ``days''.
There is much mirth--initially--as the workers struggle to
get only white balls on the paddle. The results are quite
dismal as in five attempts each worker gets fluctuating
success in keeping defects down. On day one, for example, the
five operators score the following defects respectively: 9, 6,
5, 5, 7. Eventually, the number of total red beads per day,
for the five days are: 32, 39, 39, 38, 38.
Slowly, as the game progresses, the mood turns serious as
managers realise the underlying lessons. Koshy strings
together the learnings of the red beads:
The knowledge of psychology: Operators admitted to
feeling bad when they drew red balls instead of white balls on
the paddle. Does management realise people feed bad when there
are defects, even if it is beyond their control? Instead of
blaming workers, it's management which needs to change its
mindset.
Interaction of forces: Management can optimise
processes, only if it understands the interdependence of the
components of the process such as equipment (the kind of
paddle determines the number of defects), the raw material
(instead of only white beads, there are impurities of red
beads), the method (how operators scoop the beads adds to
defects).
Capable versus incapable processes: In the
experiment the process is stable but it is incapable of
delivering defect-free results. That's because there are
defects in raw material: if 10 per cent of the total beads are
red, any random or mechanical sampling will result in close to
a 10 per cent defect rate. Managements must recognise
incapable processes.
In-control versus out-of-control processes: A
control-limit analysis of the proportion of defective beads
shows that the process is giving results within control
limits--but it is not capable of satisfying customer
requirements. Once again, it's the management's responsibility
to change the process.
Tampering: Rather than attack root causes,
managements and operators tamper with processes. Management
tampers when it shirks its responsibility of changing the
process and instead blames operators. Operators tamper with
processes by making adjustments to specified norms of
production--in the experiment, an operator tried to remove a
red bead by hand.
Common causes and special cause variation: Variables
which contribute to variation, but are not easy to
identify--like red beads in the raw material--are common
causes, which the management needs to work on. Variables which
contribute to variation but are easier to identify are special
causes--the effect of a powercut, for example--and should be
left to operators to handle.
Operational definitions: Since only red beads were
specified as a defect, at one stage, there was confusion
between the number of defects recorded by the two inspectors
in the case of `no beads'. Management must realize that the
lack of proper operational definitions causes confusion.
Theory and actual: In theory you can get zero
defects--after all, out of 850 white beads, it should be
possible to scoop out 50 white beads. In actual fact you
cannot. Managements should realize the difference--it's the
reason why sometimes, a design will not work on the shop floor.
Copyright © 1998 Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay)
Ltd.